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In A Theory of Justice John Rawls argued that people in a just society would have rights to 
some forms of personal property, whatever the best way to organise the economy.2 Without 
being explicit about it, he also seems to have believed that protection for at least some forms 
of privacy are included in the Basic Liberties, to which all are entitled.3  Thus, Rawls assumes 
that people are entitled to form families, as well as personal associations which reflect their 
tastes as well as their beliefs and interests.  He seems also to have assumed that people are 
entitled to seclude themselves, as well as to associate with others, and to keep some of their 
beliefs, knowledge, feelings and ideas to themselves, rather than being obliged to share them 
with others.  So, thinking of privacy as an amalgam of claims to seclusion, solitude, 
anonymity and intimate association,4 we can say that Rawls appears to include at least some 
forms of privacy in his account of the liberties protected by the first principle of justice.   
 
However, Rawls never makes his views about privacy explicit, or relate them to his ideas 
about property-ownership. This is unfortunate, because two familiar objections to privacy 
seem particularly pertinent to his belief that   justice as fairness can reconcile the claims of 
liberty and equality.  The first was articulated with customary panache by Judith Thomson, in 
a famous article on the moral right to privacy, in which she argued that talk of a moral right 
to privacy is confused and confusing, because privacy rights are really just property rights in 
disguise.5  The second objection has long been a staple of leftist politics, and is that the 
association of privacy with private property means that privacy rights are just a mask for 
coercive and exploitative relationships, and therefore at odds with democratic freedom, 
equality and solidarity.  If the first objection implies that Rawls is wrong to think that 
protection for privacy can be distinguished from protection of personal property, the second 
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objection implies that Rawls cannot hope to protect privacy without thereby committing 
himself to the grossest forms of capitalist inequality.   
 
In this paper I will not discuss Rawls’ views of property-owning democracy.  However, by 
clarifying the relationship between claims to privacy and claims to property-ownership, I 
hope to illuminate some of the conceptual, moral and political issues raised by Rawls’ ideas, 
and by work on the concept of a property-owning democracy, which he inspired.  As we will 
see, privacy-based justifications of private ownership are not always unappealing, and privacy 
is sometimes promoted, rather than threatened, by collective ownership.   
 
Thomson’s Critique of Privacy 
  
Judith Thomson’s objections to the idea that privacy is valuable arise not because she 
believes that solitude, confidentiality and anonymity are over-rated, or that family life is 
inseparable from sexual inequality, or a threat to proper patriotism.6  Rather, her worry is 
that talk of a moral right to privacy lumps together too many things which, however valuable 
or important, are best described and justified separately.  In particular, she thinks, once we 
realise how heterogenous people’s claims to privacy are, and reflect on the best way to 
describe and justify them, we will find that they are really best understood as examples of 
more basic rights, such as rights to own property, and property-like rights over our bodies, 
which make it wrong for others to look, listen and touch us without our permission.   
 
Thus, Thomson argues, if she’s done something wrong by sneaking into your house and 
painting your elbows green, what’s wrong is that she’s invading your property and invading 
your property-like rights over your body, which include the right not to have your body looked 
at, touched, or painted without permission.7  Similarly, she thinks, deliberate efforts to listen 
in on arguments with her husband behind closed doors violate her right not to be listened 
to, although it is not a violation of her rights to stop and get a good earful of the argument if 
her window is wide open. 8 Leaving the window open, she thinks, can be construed as 
‘waiving’, or giving up, the right not to be overheard; by contrast, she thinks, if she has 
firmly shut her windows, it should be apparent that she does not want other people to listen 
to the argument, even if they can catch snatches of it as they walk by.  
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 Likewise, she believes that it is wrong for us to try to get a peep of your wonderful 
pornographic picture without your permission, because the picture is yours – you own it, and 
one of the rights in which ownership consists is the right to withhold what you own from 
view.9  However, if you had been careless enough to leave your picture lying around where 
anyone can see it, we do not violate your property rights by getting a good look at it, 
although we may not take it home with us or try to sell it.  
 
 So, Thomson supposes, we can describe what is wrong in cases that look like invasions of 
privacy by reference to other wrongs – wrongful invasions of our rights over our bodies and 
property.  Moreover, she claims, the problem with talk of a right to privacy is not just that all 
the cases that strike us as violations of a right to privacy can be described at least as well in 
some other way, but that in none of the cases of privacy violations does it look as though the 
reason why the violation is wrong is best described by the thought ‘because we have a right to 
privacy’. 10  However, while Thomson is right that we can sometimes replace talk of privacy 
with talk of property, or with talk of property-like rights over our bodies, her claim that this 
is always true rests on fairly controversial assumptions about the nature and content of our 
moral rights, and there seems no particular reason to accept these.   
 
For example, Thomson assumes that we have a right not to be looked at, which we always 
waive when we go out in public.11 Hence, for Thomson, there is no need to invoke a right to 
privacy in order to explain why you have a right not to be looked at by intruders peeping 
through your windows, although you have no right not to be looked at as you go strolling 
down the street.  Yet Stanley Benn seems correct to distinguish a casual glance by a passer-
by – which, he agrees with Thomson, does not violate our privacy – and a fixed or pervasive 
stare which might do so. As Benn says, ‘there is a difference between happening to be seen 
and having someone closely observe, and perhaps record, what one is doing, even in a public 
place’.12  Nor does it seem right that the minute celebrities go out in public they should be 
considered fair game for photographers, as though going out for a bottle of milk, or for 
lunch with friends, means that one has relinquished the right not to be photographed.13  
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In assessing Thomson’s thesis, then, a great deal turns on how we understand the precise 
contours of our moral rights, and what we assume counts as waiving, or relinquishing those 
rights.14  The difficulty, however, is that our conceptions of property ownership and of rights 
over our bodies do not seem to have the sharpness which Thomson assumes- their precise 
extent, weight and justification, for instance, seem much less clear than she supposes.  Thus, 
many of us would agree with Thomson that it is bad manners, but not a rights-violation to 
listen to her argument with her husband, if she forgot to shut the window.  Nonetheless, we 
may still believe that we would violate her rights if we treated that wide-open French window 
as an invitation to step inside and help ourselves to her philosophy library – or just to sit in a 
chair for a quick read of one of her books.   
 
We presume that open French windows do not constitute waived rights against uninvited 
visitors, or over-enthusiastic philosophers, because the right to prevent others from entering 
our homes is of so much greater importance than the right not to be overheard.  People 
therefore need to be able to air their rooms without worrying that they will be thought to 
have given up these rights if they forget to shut their windows or doors.   Hence, our ideas 
about what counts as waiving a right depend, in part, on the importance of the right we are 
considering as well, most likely, on the typical harms which it seeks to avert, and the 
circumstances in which it is typically claimed.  
 
Once we take these points on board, it becomes much less clear that we will illuminate, 
rather than complicate, life by replacing talk of privacy rights with talk of property 
ownership and property-like rights over our bodies. More troubling, however, is the 
possibility that replacing talk of privacy with talk of liberty, property and bodily integrity 
actually confuses us about what people are claiming, and with what justification.  
 
Compare, for example, the two different bones of contention between Joyce Maynard and 
John Salinger.  The first one concerned Maynard’s desire to publish an account of their life 
together in her autobiographical work, At Home In The World.15  Publication clearly entailed a 
loss of privacy for Salinger, but he was scarcely claiming that his property rights were at 
stake: nor could he, as there are no property rights in a shared history as a couple, or in 
ordinary experience.  Maynard, of course, was claiming that she had a right to publish her 
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own experience, to publicise her privacy, even though doing so inevitably meant publicising 
some of Salinger’s as well.  Books are objects of property and, like any writer, Maynard must 
have hoped that her book would sell well and bring her wealth, as well as fame.  But it does 
not follow that her interests in publishing were primarily financial, rather than expressive, or 
that to treat her claims to publicise her privacy as claims to profit from her property would 
adequately capture her interests, either.   
 
By contrast, Maynard’s interests in selling the letters Salinger wrote to her were financial: and 
her interests in the letters were as a form of property, rather than as a record of a shared 
experience, or of insight into Salinger’s feelings, activities and character.  Salinger was unable 
to prevent the sale of the letters, but he succeeded in persuading a court that, as their author, 
no one should have the right to publish their contents without his permission.  The interests 
that Salinger sought to protect, then, were interests in confidentiality rather than in financial 
gain, and his aim in asserting his property rights over the letters was to prevent their 
publication, rather than to ensure himself a share of the profits that publication would 
generate.   
 
It is helpful, then, rather than obfuscatory, to say that the interests Salinger sought to 
vindicate were interests in privacy, rather than ownership, although the right to prevent 
publication without consent can be financially desirable.  Indeed, it is more helpful to note 
that his interests were in privacy rather than liberty, as it was only the freedom to prevent 
publication of the letters that interested him, rather than other freedoms, such as freedoms 
of expression, association or participation.  The point for Salinger, in other words, was not 
that he wanted to be consulted, or to participate in choosing publishers, formats, editors and the 
like, but that he wanted to prevent any publication at all.  Referring to Salinger’s interests as 
interests in privacy conveys that idea fairly readily, because interests in confidentiality are so 
central to most understandings of privacy.  By contrast, they are very much less central to 
ideas of liberty, which is why replacing talk of privacy with talk of liberty in this case is likely 
to be confusing, if not actually misleading.  
 
Privacy and Collective Property 
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Claims to privacy, then, are not reducible to claims to personal property, and this has 
implications for the way we approach public policy, not just philosophical analysis  
We have seen that one difficulty with trying to translate people’s claims to privacy into 
claims to property ownership is that ownership consists in a bundle of rights which can be 
disaggregated and parcelled out in different ways.  So, if I own a car or a house it is typically 
not the case that I can let them disintegrate if it suits me to do so, because there are a variety 
of state regulations which will come into force should I leave my car to rust on the street, or 
let my house fall into disrepair. This is not because someone else owns my house and car, 
merely that in these cases (and others like them), my ownership does not include the right to 
destroy my property through neglect.  On the other hand, if I rent a house or a car I will not 
have the right to sell them or to give them away, but I will have the right to use them and, 
for the duration of my lease, to exclude their owner from using them. So while it is true that 
my property rights (whether or not they constitute full ownership) may well protect my 
privacy, replacing talk of privacy with talk of property rights is unlikely to improve the clarity 
or precision of our ideas, because there are so many different, sometimes incompatible, types 
of property. 16 
 
Some forms of property are held on behalf of a group of people, such as a family or a group 
of investors, or even a nation.  Such property is often called ‘collective property’ to highlight 
the fact that ownership rights are supposed to be used on behalf of a group of people, rather 
than a single individual, and to be exercised either by some representative of the group of 
owners, or by the members of that group acting jointly.  Other forms of property are called 
‘private property’, meaning that they are held by a person, or on behalf of a person, who is 
free to exercise his or her rights of ownership without consulting others.  
 
 It seems natural to suppose we should prefer private to collective property if we value 
privacy, but such an assumption is mistaken.  True, some forms of collective property, can 
be quite invasive of privacy, as these typically mean that all owners are entitled to a say in its 
disposition.  This is notoriously the case with those New York apartment blocks which are 
cooperatively owned (even though the individual apartments are owned privately), because 
fellow owners are entitled to a good deal of information about would-be-buyers in order to 
decide whether to approve or veto any sales.  
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However, not all forms of collective property are like that.  State owned and run housing, for 
example, may be less privacy-invasive than private housing, because the information required 
in order to obtain a lease is typically held by people with whom one has less contact than 
with private landlords. So, even if the quantity of information one has to divulge is no 
smaller or less intimate, the different ways that this information is typically held, and the 
different people who typically hold it, mean that one may actually have more, rather than 
less, privacy as a renter of state- owned, rather than privately- owned property.  
 
Because private property ownership is not synonymous with privacy, the privatisation of 
public space and of public property can threaten, rather than promote, privacy.  For many of 
us, living in cramped and crowded conditions – or with noisy neighbours and families – 
public gardens, squares,  parks, libraries and museums are places where we can go for a bit 
of peace and quiet, or for a ‘private chat’ or heart-to-heart with our friends.  When such 
places are free of charge, as well as open to the public, they provide much-needed 
opportunities for solitude, anonymity and time together with friends and lovers, as well as 
fresh-air, culture and entertainment.  Hence, the creation of public facilities such as libraries, 
sports-centres, youth-centres, parks and gardens can create opportunities for privacy where, 
previously, these were few and far between.  
 
The importance of public space for privacy is highlighted by a poignant essay on 
homelessness by the philosopher and legal scholar, Jeremy Waldron. 17 One way of 
describing the plight of a homeless person is to say that ‘there is no place governed by a 
private property rule where he is allowed to be whenever he chooses, no place governed by a 
private property rule from which he may not at any time be exclude as a result of someone 
else’s say-so…For the most part, the homeless are excluded from all places governed by 
private property rules, whereas the rest of us are, in the same sense, excluded from all but one 
(or maybe all but a few) of those places’.  Hence, in a world where all collective property was 
privatised, or where no collective property – such as streets, parks, subways, shelters – was 
available for the homeless to attend to their most basic needs, the freedom of the homeless 
‘would depend utterly on the forbearance of those who owned the places that made up the 
territory of the society in question’.  
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 It matters fundamentally to the privacy of the homeless, therefore, that there be forms of 
collective property – such as the generous provision of public lavatories, and public baths - 
which are available for them to conduct activities such as sleeping, eating and urinating.  
These activities are ‘both urgent and quotidian’, as Waldron puts it, because a person simply 
cannot wait to perform them until s/he has acquired a home or some private property.  So, 
whatever else it is that we owe to those who are homeless, Waldron argues, we owe them 
places where they may legally fulfil their needs discretely in public.18  
 
 
 
 
Privacy and Private Property 
 
We have seen that claims to privacy cannot be reduced to claims to property ownership.  But 
this does not meant that the nature and value of privacy are irrelevant to what we are entitled 
to own, and what we are entitled to do with our property.  If, on the one hand, it means that 
public property may be used for private purposes such as conversations, education, fitness, 
cleanliness and shelter, on the other hand our interests in confidentiality, in anonymity, 
intimacy and domesticity help to explain why people should be entitled to some forms of 
private property, even if they are able to meet their needs for food, clothing and shelter 
through the use of property that is held in common.   
 
If privacy is valuable it seems desirable, and perhaps even necessary, that people should have 
some forms of property which they can treat as seems good to them.  For example, the idea 
of making a personal sacrifice not only of one's time but also of one's comfort and 
possessions means that we must be able to hand over – even destroy ceremonially – 
something that one would otherwise be entitled to use for oneself.  Likewise, if gifts are to 
be capable of expressing an appreciation of the particularity of another – whether that 
involves recognition of their needs as a student, a newly-wed, a parent, or of their talents, 
hobbies and tastes- it is important that our gifts are capable of expressing something about 
the giver, as well as the receiver. They may be mass-produced or handmade, cheap or 
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expensive, but if they are successfully to serve the communicative purposes of the giver, 
people must have a fair bit of scope in their selection, and in the timing of their presentation.   
 
The importance of these social, rather than financial, interests in private property is well 
brought out by Wolff and de-Shalit's study of disadvantage.19 As they say, 'Being able to care 
for others is part of being a person, at least under normal conditions, and therefore part of 
one's well-being', and an important expression of this ability to care is the desire to 
reciprocate kindness, and to show gratitude for the kindness of others. As Wolff and de-
Shalit explain, 'Showing gratitude to others, "paying one's respects", and showing joy at other 
people's joy all form part of a flourishing human life'.  
 
However, people may find themselves unable adequately to undertake the socially accepted 
acts that express their gratitude and joy because they are too poor, as well as because they 
suffer from physical disabilities.  "Doing good to others allows one self-esteem.  Being 
human means not only to receive; one wants to give', the authors were told by one of their 
interviewees; and the sense of humiliation and loss of honour that comes with the inability 
to express one's respect or love is so powerful, and so widespread across individuals and 
cultures, that Wolff and de-Shalit conclude that it constitutes a morally significant form of 
disadvantage.   
 
Strictly speaking none of this requires a set of private property rights of the sort with which 
we are familiar.  We could instead imagine some sort of store house (or set of store houses, 
spread around like cinemas and pubs) to which people could go and, in exchange for the 
promise of a certain number of hours of work (either there or elsewhere) could choose an 
object which they could then use as a gift or keep for themselves.  This would still require 
people to have considerable discretion in when, how and why they use their time, as well as 
assuming that they are entitled to exchange their time for objects which they can use as they 
please.   
 
However, this sort of arrangement would not enable us to give gifts which are personal in 
the sense of being objects which had belonged to us, been used by us, or been made by us.  
Nor would it mean that we would access, ourselves, to objects whose use may be functional, 
March 26 2011 9 
but which also have emotional and symbolic significance for us. So, thinking about this 
example illuminates the significance of forms of ownership that enable us to keep, use, lend 
and give away things that are ours, in the sense of having been a part of our lives,  as an 
expression of our particular beliefs, attachments and ideals.  
 
 Private ownership is not just about the right to use objects such as clothes, beds and 
furniture, or to feed ourselves and our loved ones.  Rather, it is about the ability to find 
forms of these that suit us, and respond to our particular beliefs and needs, tastes and 
temperaments.  So, while it would require a whole book to explore what forms of private 
property are justified by people's claims to privacy, it looks as though the value of privacy 
justifies some forms of private, as well as collective, property.   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 We have seen that Thomson is wrong to treat claims to privacy as though they are just 
claims to property in disguise.  Granted that both the value of privacy and the moral right to 
privacy will likely overlap with other values and rights, we have seen that talk of privacy can 
illuminate the importance of specific liberties and specific goods and bads that we might 
otherwise overlook or misinterpret. An implication of this is that privacy is not the threat to 
economic equality which is sometimes supposed, even though it will sometimes justify us in 
creating forms of property that are private rather than public.   
 
There are two main reasons for this.  The first is that the value of privacy is unlikely to 
justify the creation, maintenance and control of significant personal wealth and economic 
power.  Though people’s interests in solitude, intimacy and family life are both various and 
competitive – since we cannot all get what we want when we want it- there is nothing about 
the nature or importance of these interests which suggests that societies should be 
indifferent to concentrations of wealth and power or to significant differences in people’s 
life chances consequent on the ownership of different amounts of property. Justifications of 
private property based on the value of privacy then, do not commit us to any substantive 
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theses about the best way to organise the production and exchange of goods, the virtues of 
competition, or the benefits of a free market in general, or in particular.   
 
Secondly, it is important to remember that what counts as a legitimate object of property, as 
well as what counts as a morally permissible way to acquire and use that property, depends 
on the assumptions we make about the moral status of people, of animals, of natural 
resources and of human labour.  So justifications of collective or state-run property will not 
be democratic if minorities can be enslaved, if prisoners can be turned into indentured 
servants or if the labour of women is valued at less than the labour of men.  That is why, 
when thinking about the value of privacy relative to other values, and the respective content 
and justification of privacy rights relative to other rights, it is important to be clear about the 
political assumptions involved.  
 
Talk about privacy then, is not pointless or simply confused.  However, the reasons why it is 
not highlight the importance of politics to the morality. The value we attribute to privacy 
depends, fundamentally, on how we conceive people’s interests, circumstances and 
prospects, and for this we need to make some assumptions about the power that they have 
relative to others.  That is why privacy is a deeply political value, inextricably connected to 
the ways we conceive ourselves as individuals and as members of society.  Clarifying the 
connections between privacy and property-ownership, therefore, seems essential to any 
democratic conception of justice, as well as to the Rawlsian-inspired ideal of a property-
owning democracy.   
 
  
                                                 
1 This article is based on ch. 4 of my book, On Privacy, New York: Routledge, 2011.  I am grateful to 
Routledge for permission to reuse the chapter here.  I am also grateful to Alan Thomas for inviting me to 
present my work on privacy to the conference on property-owning democracy which he organised at the 
University of Tilburg, in the summer of 2011.   
2 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1971, and in Justice as Fairness: 
A Restatement, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001, pp. 114 and 138 he reiterates his view that 
some form of personal property is the material basis for personal independence and self-respect.   
3 The point emerges at p. 45 in Justice as Fairness: a Restatement, where Rawls explains how one should 
decide what counts as a basic right or liberty, distinguishing those which are necessary for citiyens to judge 
the justice of their society and its social policies from those which are enable citizens to form and revise a 
personal conception of the good.  Rawls uses liberty of conscience and freedom of association as examples 
of the latter and their importance.  
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4 In the introduction to On Privacy, I explain why the difficulties of coming up with a suitable 
philosophical definition of privacy mean that treating privacy as a composite is the best way to think about 
it at present. 
5 Judith Jarvis Thomson, “The Right to Privacy”, in Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy, ed. Ferdinand 
Shoeman, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, 272-289.  Thomson’s article was originally 
published in Philosophy and Public Affairs. 4. 1975, and has been anthologised many times since.  
6 By way of comparison, see Catherine A. MacKinnon’s famous feminist critique of privacy as a bulwark 
for sexual inequality in her essay, “Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade” in her collection of essays, 
Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983.  Or 
consider Plato’s concerns, in Book V of the Republic that Guardians should have no private property and 
no families of their own, so as not to distract them from the common good.  These concerns find an echo in 
Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, Vol. 2, ch. 6 entitled “What Sort of Despotism Democratic 
Nations Have to Fear”.  
7 See Thomson, p. 279: '...it's a nasty business to damage a knee; but you've a right to damage yours, and 
certainly nobody else has – its being your left kneed includes your having the right that nobody else but you 
shall damage it.  And, as I think, it also includes your having the right that nobody else shall touch it or 
look at it'.  Summarising her view, Thomson says, (p. 280) 'These rights – the right not to be looked at and 
the right to not be listened to – are analogous to rights we have over our property.  It sounds funny to say 
we have such rights.  They are not mentioned when we give lists of rights...These un-grand rights seem to 
be closely enough akin to be worth grouping together under one heading.  For lack of a better term, I shall 
simply speak of "the right over the person", a right which I shall take to consist of the un-grand rights I 
mentioned, and others as well'.  
8 Thomson p. 273 for the contrast between the loud fight and the quiet fight behind closed doors.  
9 Thomson, p. 287: Someone looks at your pornographic picture in your wall-safe? He violates your right 
that your belongings not be looked at, and you have that right because you have ownership rights – and it is 
because you have them that what he does is wrong'.  
10 Thomson, p. 286-7: 'The fact, supposing it is a fact, that every right in the right to privacy cluster is also 
in some other right cluster does not by itself show that the right to privacy is in any plausible sense a 
"derivative" right.  A more important point seems to me to be this: the fact that we have a right to privacy 
does not explain our having any of the rights in the right to privacy cluster....That we feel the need to find 
something in common to all of the rights in the cluster and, moreover, feel we haven't yet got it in the very 
fact that they are all in the cluster, is a consequence of our feeling that one cannot explain our having any 
of the rights in the cluster in the words: "Because we have a right to privacy". (emphasis in the original).  
But while I agree with Thomson that we have a right against torture, I do not see that this shows we do not 
have a right to privacy too, which would also be violated if we were tortured to extract personal 
information.  The same act can be wrong for a variety of reasons, and violate a variety of rights.  It is 
therefore possible that being tortured to extract personal information is worse than being tortured to affirm 
or negate some statement of scientific or political fact, because in some cases of torture the violation of 
privacy would constitute an additional and very significant part of the wrong, as it would not if the personal 
information were of no particular significance to you or to your torturers.  
11 P. 285: '...it seems to me that if you do go out in public, you waive your right to not be photographed and 
looked at.  But of course you...have a right to be free of ...annoyance in public places; so in particular, you 
have a right that the photographers and crowds not press in too closely' just because they are desperate to 
get a look, or a 'shot' of you.  For the application of these ideas to debates on the use of CCTV, see 
Annabelle Lever, “Mrs. Aremac and the Camera: A Response to Ryberg,”  Res Publica: A Journal of Legal 
and Social Philosophy, 14.1. (March 2008) 35-42 as well as the piece by Benjamin Goold in the same 
issue.  
12 Stanley I. Benn, ‘Privacy, Freedom and Respect for Person’, in Ferdinand Schoeman, ed.  The 
Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy. p. 225 
13 The issue of whether celebrities can legally be photographed without their consent while going about 
their daily life is one of the most controversial issues in UK and EU law.  Since von Hannover v. Germany 
– where Princess Caroline of Monaco won a case of this sort – it looks as though European law will follow 
the stricter French perspective in these matters than the laxer German and UK ones.  See Privacy and the 
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Press, Joshua Rozenberg, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.  Rozenberg laments the decision in the 
Princess Caroline case, xiii-iv.  See also www.rozenberg.net  
14 Thomson, ‘the right to privacy’ p. 278, for example.  It should be noted that this article is very old – it 
was written in 1975.  For those interested in the more developed versions of Thomson’s theory of rights, 
see the following collections of her essays: Rights, Restitution and Risk: Essays (Harvard University Press, 
1986) and The Realm of Rights (Harvard University Press, 1990) 
15 Daphne Joyce Maynard published At Home in the World in 1998.  It described the ten months, in 1972, 
when she lived with Salinger.  
16 Those interested in recent debates in the philosophy of property may want to look at Stephen R. Munzer's 
A Theory of Property. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990; John P. Christman's The Myth of 
Property: Toward an Egalitarian Theory of Ownership. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, and G. A. 
Cohen's Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, which are 
efforts to understand, evaluate and then revise from an egalitarian perspective, traditional views of 
property.    
17 ‘Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom’, ch. 13, in Jeremy Waldron, Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 
1981-1991, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, 309-338.  This a fantastic collection of essays 
for anyone interested in understanding the nature and structure of rights, as used in moral and legal 
contexts,  and provides a helpful introduction to contemporary debates over human rights, welfare rights 
and rights and duties of toleration.  
18 To those who say that the streets and subway are not places for sleeping; that parks are not places for 
urinating or cooking, Waldron’s response is this: perhaps they ought not to be; just as there ought not to be 
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